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SPEECH 



OF 



THE HON. JAMES EMOTT, 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



THE UNITED STATES 

DELIVERED THE \2th JANUARY, 1813, 

ON THE BILL IIT ADDITION TO THE ACT ENTITLED, 

" AN ACT TO RAISE AN ADDITIONAL MIUTARY FORCE," 
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 

NEW-YORK : 

rSINTED BY J. SEYMOUR, NO. 49, JOHN-STREET- 

1813. 



SPEECH 

4t. 



^R. CHAIRMAN, 

I MEAN no common-place remark, when I declare to you, thai 
1 address you on the subjects which have beon brought into this 
debate, and as I think properly so brought, with great reluc- 
tance. My general deportment since I have been honoured 
with a seat on this floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the 
committee, that I feel an unwillingness to mingle in the war of 
words, which is carried on here. There are causes which add 
to this repugnance on the present occasion. The debate has 
been continued for such a length of time, and in part has been 
conducted with so much asperity, that the minds of all have 
become fatiii;ued, and the passions of many inflamed. I know, 
and I duly appreciate the difficulties which, under such circum- 
stances, surround and face the speaker. Bui, sir, there are con- 
siderations of public duty, and individual propriety, which urge, 
nay, demand of me, to ask your patience, and the indulgence of 
the house, while I present to you and to them my view of thQ 
great subjects involved in this discussion. 

1 listened, sir, with great attention, and certainly with much 
pleasure, to the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr. Robertson) 
who addressed the house for the first time yesterday. Against 
some of his positions, and some of his doctrines, I must how- 
ever enter my protest. The gentleman, in the silence of the 
minority, finds cause for censure ; they are not of equal utility 
Avith guide-posts; which, if they do not accompany the traveller 
in his journey, at least point to his way. And yet when it oc- 
curred to him, that the minority did sometimes interpose with 
their advice, their directions, and if you please, their censure, 
they were held up by him, as fit objects of distrust.' The ulti- 
mate object of the opposition being, as he supposes, power, he 
appears to think that when they do advise, it will be for the 
purpose of embarrassing their opponents, of procuiing their 
assent to measures, which will end in their downfal. Thus, if 
■we remain silent, we do not perform our duly ; and if we object 
to majority plans and views, or propose measures which are 
not stamped with the mark of executive approbation, wc 
do worse ; we are plotting the destruction of the men in 
place, not with a view to the public welfare, but to individual in^ 
lerest. This is really placing the minority in an awkward situa- 
tion ; and after all we shall, I believe, have to pursue the track 
uf former mioorities* With the good pleasure of the genti*- 



man, we will continue to mark the public course of publit 
men, anrl when we believe they lose siglit of, or disregard, the 
essential rights and vital interests of the people, for whose 
welfare, and at whose expense, this governnicnt is maintained, 
we must be allowed to oppose them in a constitutional and or- 
derly manner. 

The gentleman from Louisiana, has gone into a course of 
reasoning, to repel the charge and the suspicion of French in- 
fluence, in or out of the administration. With his facts, or his 
deductions, I have nothing to do. J hope it is true, that there 
is no understanding between our government and that of France, 
with respect to the measures which have been formerly adopt- 
ed, or are now pursuing, against Great-Britain. Nay, I am wil- 
ling to allow, that the persons in the majority, are as pure in 
their views, and as patriotic in their intentions, as men in the op- 
position can be. But after saying this, I hope I may be permit- 
ted to ask the gentleman to re-consider the judgment he has 
been pleased to pass upon the Northern and Eastern parts of 
the union. He believes in the existence of a British party in 
that country, and intimates, that the charge of a French influ- 
ence elsewhere is a mere cover: it is a dust, raised to draw 
off" the attention, or obscure the vision of the people. Sir. we 
semetimes hear of this charge of British influence at the east- 
ward. The charge is made there by the wicked, and not un- 
frequently believed by the weak ; the latter have our pity, the 
former our contempt. 

The influence of British feelings ! Yes, sir, the eastern peo- 
ple are sometimes actuated by British feelings, but they are the 
feelings which operated on their ancestors, when they left Eng- 
land, l>ecause they loved liberty, and hated oppression. They 
are the feelings, which operated on some, even of the present 
generation, when they staked their homes, and their fire-sidea, 
on a contest for their political rights; when, at the hazard of 
their lives and fortunes, they opposed British power and claims. 
The influence of British principles ! Yes, sir, they arc actuat- 
ed by British principles, but, they are the principles of a Mil- 
ton, a Locke, and a Sidney ; principles which teach them that 
government is intended for the benefit of the people, and not 
for advantage of their agents ; principles which teach them, that 
it is not only the right, but the bounden duty of the people, to 
mark the conduct of their rulers, and to reason on its fitness ; to 
bestow applause where it is due, and not to v/iihhold censure 
where it is merited. When, sir, they shall no longer be actual- 
ed by such feelings, and such principles ; when they shall sub- 
scribe to the doctrines, that the men in power can do no wrong ; 
tha*^ the will of the executive is in all cases to be obeyed, and 
thai they must speak of the acts of the administration, only to 
applaud— then I shall begin to believe, that they are under the 
influence of French principles, and are fit for slaves. 



Mr. Ciiairman, I am aware that in the discussion I am about 
commencing, I shall render myself obnoxioub to the wit of gen- 
tlemen who think that to bring into view other topics, than those 
which arise out of the details of the bill now on your table, is to 
go beyond the range of legitimate debate The bill contem- 
plates the raising an additional military force of twenty thou- 
sand men, thus increasing the military establishment, or the 
standing army of the country, to upwards of f-fty-Jive thousand 
■men. Now, sir, with the details of this bill 1 have nothing to 
do. Nay, 1 will confess to you that I like the bill as it stands, 
providing for enlistments for one year only, better than 1 should, 
were it amended as has been proposed, by prolonging the term, 
precisely for the reason that the force will be less efficient and 
dangerous, and more under legislative control. I meddle not 
with the fitness of the instrument. That is the business of other 
men. But being opposed to the continuance of the war offen- 
sively, as I was to its commencement, I cannot consent to grant 
any fur; her force to carry it on. The only check or control 
which the legislature can constiiutioiially have over a war after 
it is begun, is in withholding the means ; and in voting the means, 
cither in men or money, every member of (he legislature ought 
\o I e satisfied of ihc necessity of prosecuting the war. 

According to my brsl judgm ni, sir, this war was improperly 
commenced, and is uiinccessarily continued; and I shall no\T 
proceed to . xptain the grounds of that judgment by an cxanii- 
niition of the causes of the war, as they existed at its commence- 
ment, and as they now remum. As this is the first time tliat the 
subject has been brought into debate, and indeed the earliest 
opportunity which has been allowed, of an open discussion, 1 
am sure I shall be p.irdoned for going into detail, if I even 
should be tedious, as I know I shall be uninteresting. It is a 
right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly my reasons 
and motives for the votes which 1 have given, and may give, in 
relation to the war, after what has been said in this house, and 
out of it, about the opposition to the views of the administration. 

In making this examination, I shall pass in review, in as brief 
a manner as possible, the three great subjects of complaint 
against Great-Britain: her orders of blockade, her orders in 
coimcil, and her practice of impressment. But for one or all 
of these, the war certainly would not have been declared ; and I 
may assume that but for one or all of these, the war ought not 
to be continued. I cannot indeed but recollect, that the gentle- 
man from Louisiana, has mentioned the conquestof Canada, and 
of the Floridas, as causes for the continuance of the war. As 
respects the Canadas, I have heretofore understood that their 
reduction might be a consequence of the war, but never till now 
did I know, that it was to be shifted into a cause for carrying it 
on. And in regard to the Floridas, 1 w ill not consent tlu-t their 
cojKjuest should, in the existing relations of this country, be 



G 

ciUiCX' a cause or a consequence of war. I will confess to yoij, 
that an invasion of the colonics of Spain at this time, under the 
.stale excuses of convenience, or necessity, strikes me with ab- 
Jiorrence. It is not only against the genius of our government, 
and as I hope the character of our people, but if persisted in, 
\lill be a foul blot in our national history. 

AS TO THE BRITISH BLOCKADES. 

In order that 1 may not be said to misrepresent the views of 
the executive government, or of this house, I will read to you 
the charge of the one and the other respecting blockades. The 
Presitlent, in his war message of June last, says, " Under pre- 
tended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force, and 
sometimes without the practicability of'applying one, our com- 
merce has been plundered in every sea." What is thus gene- 
ralized by the executive, is made particular by the report of the 
committee of foreign relations, which it will be recollected, and 
I make the observation once for all, was made the act of this 
house by placing it, against all former usage, on the journals. 

The report, after a dissertation on the carrying trade, and its 
interruption by the British, proceeds to say, "in May, 1806, the 
whole coast of the continent, from Elbe to Brest inclusive, was 
declared to be in a state of blockade. By this act, the well-es- 
tablished principles of the laAv of nations, principles which have 
served for ages as guides, and fixed the boundary between the 
rights of belligerents and neutrals, were violated." This then 
being the charge, we may inquire, whether the order of block- 
ade, of May, 1806, was really a just cause of war in June, 1812, 
and whether it yet continues to be so ? 

1 understand, Mr. Chairman, that the British government, 
theoretically at least, admits the ancient rule of national law I'e- 
specting blockades. Not to go further back than the corres- 
pondence of 1811 ; the British Minister in his letter of July 3, 
to the Secretary of State, in reference to this very blockade, de- 
clared, " if the orders in council should be abrogated, the block- 
ade of May, 1806, could not continue under our construction oi 
the law of nations, unless that blockade should be maintained by 
a due application of an adequate naval force." Indeedj sir, the 
President in his message, and the committee of foreign relations 
m their report, distinctly admit the correctness of the British 
theory, and urge it by way of complaint against her practices. 
I have not discovered that we have changed our ground on this . 
subject. We have not yet, to my knowledge, adopted the Na- 
poleon principle of maritime law, that a blockade requires a 
besieging force, and can only be applied to strong or fortified 
ports. It therefore follows, that the dispute with England, re- 
lative to blockades, is not about any new principle advanced by 
her, but about her practice in opposition to her own principles 
and our avowed doctrine. Now, sir, with this view of the 



subject, was the ordei' of blockade of May, 1806, a cause of wai- 
:n 1812? 

The order of blockade of the 16th of May, 1806, with an ex- 
ception which I will presently notice, declares " the coast, ri- 
rers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both 
inclusive," to be in a state of blockade, but provides thai such 
blockade was not to extend to neutral vessels, laden with goods 
not being enemy's property or contraband of war, provided that 
the vessel going in, had not been laden at a port belonging to 
an enemy, and the vessel going out was not destined to an ene^ 
my's port, and had not previously broken tlie blockade. 

In regard to so much of the order as rchites to enemy*s 
pioperty and contraband of war, it afl'ords no ground of com- 
plaint ; as by the law of nations we could not, even in the absence 
of a blockade, cover the former or trade in the latter. The ob- 
jectionable part of the order must therefore be that which pro- 
hibits the entry of a neutral vessel, which had loaded at an ene- 
my's port, and the departure of a ship destined for an enemy's 
port. Now the obvious effect of these restrictions, was to pre- 
vent neutrals from carrying on the colonial, and engaging in 
the coasting, trade of France. The inward hound vessel was 
not to have a cargo which had been put on board in a French 
port, and thus the trade from a colony to the nuither country, 
as well as the coasting trade in the latter, waa prevented. The 
outward bound vessel was not to be intended for a Ficmch port, 
and thus the trade from the mother country to the colony was 
prohibited. If the order had an operation beyond this, it must 
have been almost a thing of accident. 

Let it now be recollected, that the British have, from the year 
1756, contended that a neutral was not authorized by the law of 
nations, to engage during war in an unaccustomed trade with 
the colonies, or on the coasts of their enemy. To capture ves- 
sels engaged in such trade, we know that they did not think it ne- 
cessary to resort to blockades. By thisorder,theretore, theyclaim- 
cd no new right, nor did they under it exercise any new power 
over neutrals. In fact, while it prohil)ited the direct, it left free, 
or rather threw open to neutrals, the indirect colonial trade. 
The nature of the cargo, or its origin, was not a subject of inqui 
ry : it was sunkient that it was not put on board the vessel at a 
French port. And wc have the authority of the administration, 
for saying that in this respect, it was not only calculated to bene- 
fit our merchants, but tliat they actually were benefited by it. 
In the letter from Mr. Munroe to Mr. Foster, of the 1st of 
October, 1811, it is expressly stated, — <' That this order, by al- 
lowing the trade of neutrals in colonial proiluctions to all that 
portion of the coast which was not rigorously blockaded, af- 
forded to the United States an accommodation in a i)rincipal 
point then at issue between our governments, and of Avhi.!; 
their citizens extensively availed themselves." 



8 

Wiien we look at the order of blockade in this point of vievv; 
and without the exception, it is surely not necessury to ascer- 
tain the extent of coast embraced by it, nor to calculate the num- 
ber of ships it would take to blockade such coast. This may 
be pretty amusement for grown children, who need examples iu 
the first rules in arithmetic, but it is unworthy of grave states- 
men, when deciding on the momentous question of peace or 
war. It was in a special manner, as I shall more distinctly 
show hereafter, unworthy of the member of the administration 
who has taken a lead in this war, and who, in the opinions of ma- 
ny, is now nursing it. Such a blockade was in itself harmless^ 
nay, more, it was beneficial to us. It wanted no fleets to en- 
force it. Our merchants at the time would have seen with 
pleasure a like blockade of all the coasts, rivers, and ports, from 
North Point to the Rock of Gibraltar. 

It remains then, Mr. Chairman, to be seen, whether the ex- 
ception in the order of May, made it so objectionable as to cali 
for war. The order, after stating the kind of trade which was 
not to be interrupted, has this expression, " save and except the 
coast, rivers, and ports, from Ostend to the river Seine, already 
in a state of strict and rigorous blockade, and which are to be 
considered as so continued." In truth, as the mere reading oi 
the order will show, if there is any thing substantially hostile to 
our rights to be found in it, it is in this saving clause — With 
this, the order may be considered as a blockade of the coast from 
Ostend to the Seine, but surely not beyond that. Indeed, the ad- 
ministration so well understood this, that Mr. Monroe, in his let- 
ter to Mr. Foster, of the 1st of October, 1811, declares it almost 
in terms. " If, (says Mr. Monroe,) you will examine the order, 
yon will find that it is strictly little more than a blockade of the 
coast from the Seine to Ostend. There is an express reserva- 
tion in it in favour of neutrals to any part of the coast between 
Brest and the Seine, and between Ostend and the Elbe. Neu- 
tral powers are permitted by it to take from their own ports 
every kind of produce, without distinction as to its origin, and 
to carry it to the continent, under that limitation, and with the 
exception only of contraband of war and enemy's property, and 
to bring thence to their own ports in return whatever articles 
they think fit." 

An attentive perusal of the exception will establish another 
fact, that the order of May, 1806, was not even a blockade of 
the coast from Ostend to the Seine. It merely excludes that 
country from the benefits which were to arise to neutrals un- 
der the order, by recognizing the existence of a prior blockade, 
and providing for its continuance. The blockade thus kept 
alive, is that of the 9th of August, 1804 — " At the entrance of 
the ports of Fecamp, St. Vallery au Caux, Deippe, Treport, 
the Somme, Naples, Boulogne, Calais, Gravelincs, Dunkirk, 
New-port, and Ostend." And of this blockade wc hear of no 



9 

oinpiaint, cither as Vo its extent, or the want of ability to eU' 
fOicx it. 

Will Identic men now say, what has never yet been prctend- 
eil, that from the extent of coast, the British could not, or did 
not, enforce the blockade ? We may ask. them to look at the 
order, and then say whether it contains a fair enumeration of 
the principal ports or points. If so, and I think I may venture 
to say it does, had not the British at the time a sufficient naval 
force to blockade eleven or twelve places in their own seas, 
and almost in sight of their own coasts ? If this is admitted, 
and I presume no one will undertake to question it, arc we not 
certain, from our knov>fled£jc of tlic history of the times, that 
such force was applied ? Do we not know that Bonaparte not 
only threatened an invasion of England at the time, but had a 
powerful army encamped for the purpose on this very coast ? 
And do Ave yet doubt whether, under such circumstances, the 
British had not a naval force on the French coast, and before 
these places, sufficiently strong to enforce the blockade ? 

There is Rtill one other circumstance in relation to the or- 
der of May, 1806, which is worthy of notice, and that is, 
that it was an act of the Fox administration. To those who 
have attended to the history of that great man, it is well known, 
tlxii Charles James Fox was, at every period of his life, and in 
all circumstances, the open and the sincere friend of this coun- 
try. When we were colonies of Great-Britain, we had his ex- 
ertions, and after our independefice, his wishes, in our favour. 
To the last moment of his life, he fell interested in our prosper 
rity. It was indeed, if we are to believe Monroe^ his ruling 
passion strong in death. And yet we arc now called on to say, 
that ujider the guise of friendship, he not only contemplated a 
vital blow at our neutral rights, but actually did the djeed. We 
are now willing, in the face of the world, to declare that this 
great champion of neutral rights, and American interests, was 
the author and founder of a system, which not only made just 
and proper the French d( orccs, but which called for war on. 
the part of this nation. — Sir, it is not doing justice to the rae- 
juory of the man, or his intentions towards us, to say so. 

Thus far, Mr. Chairman, I have ventui*ed on the face of the 
order itself; but to make assurance doubly sure, I will now place 
before you the opinions of the very persons who recommend- 
ed war on account of the blockade. These opinions, given at 
different times, will prove most satisfactorily, that as long as 
the order of blockade of May, 1806, had a practical effect and 
operation ; while it still had substance as well as form, it was 
not only not viewed by the administration as violating our neu- 
tral lights, but was received as a benefit to this country, and a 
relaxation on the part of Great-Britain. 

The order, it will be recollected, bears date the 16th of 
May, and it was communicated by Mr. Monroe, then our 
Minister at London, to Mi'. INladisnn, the*!! Scrretary of Slate, 



10 

by a letter dated the 17th. In this letter Mr. Monroe sayS;. 
" early this morning I received from Mr. Fox a note, a co- 
py of which is enclosed, which you will perceive embraces 
explicitly a principal subject depending between our govern- 
ments, though in rather a singular mode." The note is 
couched in terms of restraint, and professes to extend the 
blockade further than was heretofore done ; nevertheless, it 
takes it from many ports already blockaded ; indeed, from all 
east of Ostend and west of the Seine, except in articles con- 
traband of war and enemy's property, which are seizable with- 
out a blockade. And in like form of exception, considering 
every enemy as one power, it admits the trade of neutrals with= 
in the same limit to be free in the productions of enemy's co- 
lonies in every, but the dii ect, route between the colony and the 
parent country." — " It cannot be doubted that the note was 
drawn by the government in reference to the question, and if in- 
tended by the cabinet as a foundation on which Mr. Fox is 
authorized to form a treaty, and obtained by him for that pur- 
pose, it must be viewed in a very favourable light.'* 

On the 2()th of May, JNlr. Monroe again writes to this go- 
vernment, and speaking of the order, he says, '' from what I 
could collect, I have been strengthened in the opinion, which I 
communicated to you in my last, that Mr. Fox's note of the 
]5th was drawn with a view to a principal question with the 
United Sates, I mean that of the trade with enemies colonies." 
In a letter of the 9th cf June, after detailing a conversation 
•with Mr. Fox in part relating to the order, Mr. Monroe de- 
clares, " I concluded however from this conversation, as 1 had 
done from what had occurred before, that this measure had been 
taken to prevent the further seizure and condemnation of our 
vessels on the principle in discussion between our govern- 
ments,"-—*-' sevei'al ciixumstances, independent of those alluded 
tio, support this idea. It is not necessary to state them, because 
I trust the business will ere long be placed on a much more 
solid footing." 

Here then we have a full expression of the opinion of Mr. 
Monroe at the time, and formed, as it would seem, with all due 
caution. But it may be said, that he was too credulous on 
this occasion : that he was deceived by the British minis- 
try, and that he afterwards discovered and renounced his 
error. Hear what he says in his new capacity of Secretary 
of State, to Mr. Foster, in his letter already referred to, of the 
1st of October, 1811. After remarking on the order of May, 
1806, that it was strictly little more than a blockade of the coast 
from the Seine to Ostend, he observes, " why then did the Bri- 
tish government institute a blockade, which with respect to neu- 
trals was not rigorous as to the greater part of the coast com- 
prised in it ? If you will look to the state of things which then 
existed between the United States and Great-Britain, you will 
fir.d the answer ; a controversy had taken place between our go^ 



11 

vernments on a different topic, which was still depending. The 
British government had interfered with the trade between 
France and her allies in the produce of their colonies. The just 
claim of the United States was then a subject of negociation, and 
your government professing its willingness to make a satisfacto- 
ry arrangement of it, issued tke order which allowed the trade, 
without making any concession as to the principle, reserving 
that for adjustment by treaty. It was in this light that I view- 
ed, and in thfs sense that I represented, that order to my go- 
vernment." 

This gentleman has, in this case at least, the merit of con- 
sistency. His opinion of the oixler in 1806, as negociator, was 
not changed, when, in 18 1 1, as Secretary of State, he was in 
possession of the views, the wishes, and the information of the 
■executive government. It is possible, however, though cer- 
tainly not very probable, that he may be mistaken on this sub- 
ject, and if he is, we will surely find the mistake exposed and 
corrected l)y the committee of foreign relations. Permit me, sir, 
to read to you the part of their " report or manifesto," which 
contains their opinion of the order. " Your committee think 
it just to remark, that this act of the British government does 
not appear to have been adopted in the sense in which it has 
been since construed. On consideration of all the circumstances 
attending the measure, and particularly the character of the dis- 
tinguished statesman who announced it, we are persuaded that 
it was conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and intended to lead 
to an accommodation of all differences between the United 
States and Great-Britain." 

Notwithstanding this broad apology, if not justification, of the 
order, the committee deemed it a just cause of war; and why, 
Mr. Chaii-mau ? Because " it has been made by his successors 
a pretext for that vast system of usurpation, which has so lonjj 
oppressed and harassed our commerce." Indeed I and are we 
to commence and carry on an offensive war, on account of the 
order of blockade, not for its own demerit, but because it was 
made a pretext for another system ? But where do gentlci- 
men learn that the order of May, 1806, was made a pretext for 
the orders in council ? Certainly they do rot find it in the or- 
ders themselves, nor in the attempted justification of them by 
the British government. Heretofore I had understood, that,the 
pretext for the orders in council, were the French decrees, 
and the war on British commerce commenced by those decrees. 

But not to detain you longer on this subject, let me say, that 
as it appears the order of May, 1806, was adopted to benefit and 
not to injure our commerce ; as it was so understood by this go- 
vernment at the time and up to the moment when war was de- 
clared ; as it was rjeally without any possible operation, good or 
bad, when war was resolved on, it follows that it was not a just 
■i'ause of war. 

If, howe-ver, the blockajile of May, 1 806, M'as a just cause of wa"? 



in June, 1 8 J 2, is it so novr ? On the 29il) of June Lord Ciistlcreagb 
infornjecl our agent in England, what we indeed already knew, 
that in point of fact this bloci^ade had been discontinued for a 
considerable length of time, and that there was no inteiition o( 
recurring to it Avithout a new notice to neutrals in the usuaj 
forms ; and we have the authority of the hdministration for say- 
ing, that they arc satisfied on ^his point. The order has there- 
fore fairly sunk beneath the hoiizon. It is emphatically no loii ■ 
p-er a cause of controversy or of war. 

One word more on the subject of blockades, and I have done 
with them. The President, on the 6th of July last, sent to this 
Jhouse a report of the Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, of the 
captures made by the belligerents during the present European 
Avar, and of the edicts bearing up'on neutial conmieree. In the 
enumeration of edicts, we have the British blockade of the canal 
of Corfu, of the 18th of August, 1810, which he says " in effect 
■was an attempt to blockade the whole Adriatic sea." An at'- 
lempt thus to close a sea upon neutrtds, was certainly a novel, 
and most injurious, application of the right of blockade. The 
case w-as cited to us, as explanatory of the hostile views and 
practices of Great-Britain, as a practical commentary on the ex- 
ecutive text, relative to British blockades. But what will you 
say, sir, when you find from papers on your table, which have 
been sent from the office of state, that the Secretary has either 
mistaken or mistatcd the extent of this blockade ? Such in truth 
is the fact. Mr. Pinkney, in his latter of the 24th of August, 
1810, transmitting tlit; notification of the blockade, intimates that 
it is a blockade of the Adriatic ; but in that of the 7th of Sep- 
tember foUowine^^ he declares to the goverment, that this con- 
struction appears to be erroneous, and that " the canal to which 
the notification is now understood to apply, is the narrow pas- 
sage to the eastward of Corfu." This blockade therefore of 
an entire sea, dwindles down to that of the strait, between the 
island of Corfu and the Grecian shore. Rellections will urge 
themselves on the mind, on a statement so manifestly untrue ; 
but I pass them over. 

THE BRITISH ORDERS IjY COUATCIL. 

After mentioning blockades, the President, in his war mes- 
sage of June last, brings to view the next great subject of com- 
plaint, the Orders in Council. — " Not content with these occa- 
sional expedients fur laying waste our neutral trade, the cabinet 
of Great-Britain resorted at length to the sweeping system of 
blockades, under the name of Orders in Council ; which has 
been moulded and managed as might best suit its political views, 
lis commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruizers." 

The committee of foreign relations, in this, as in the case of block- 
ades, niake particular what was left general by the executive'; 
and they have so fai' at least the merit of making out to the na- 
tion, and to the world, the actual causes of the war. The Order 



\6 

■A\ Council of January, 1807, the first of tlie series, is mentioned 
as a matier of history ; but as this had passed away, the commit- 
tee place the grievance of the nation on the order of NoverrLber, 
1307. — " Wc proceed to bring into view the British Order ia 
Council of November 11, 1807, which superseded every ocher 
order, and consummated that system of hostility on the com- 
merce of the United States, which has been since so steadily- 
pursued. By this order, ail France, and her allies, and every 
country at war with Great-Britain, or with which she was not at 
war, from which the British Aug was excluded, and all the colo- 
nies of her enemies, were subjected to the same restrictions as 
if they were actually blockaded, in the most stricc anti rigorous 
manner ; and all trade, in articles, the produce and manufacture 
of the said countries and colonies, and the vessels engajied in 
't, were subjected to capture and condemnation as lawful prize." 
•' It would be superfluous in your committee to state, that by 
this order the British government declared direct and positive 
war against the United States." 

This order is certainly extensive in Its terms and operation, 
and gave strong grounds of complaint to neutral nations. But 
there was one objection to making it a substantive cause of war 
ia 1812, and that is, that it really had not then a le^al existence. 
Yes, sir, sti'ange as it may seem, we were called upon to de- 
clare war, and did declare war, for a thing wliich rested only in 
history. The British Order in Council of the 26ih of April, 
1809, after reciting llie order of 1807, exfiressly rn-okes it, and 
ihen declares, " that all the ports and places as far north as the 
river Ems, inclusively, under the government of France, to- 
gether with the colonies, plantations, and settlements in the 
possession of those governments respectively, and all ports and 
places in the northern parts of Italy, to be reckoned from the 
ports of Orbetello and l^esaro, inclusively," shall continue sub- 
ject to the restrictions of blockade, " and every vessel trading 
from and to the said countries or colonies, plantations or settle- 
ments, together with all goods and merchandise on board, shall 
be condemned as prize to the captors." 

It may be said, and to a certain extent it is certainly true, that 
the orders of November, 1807, and of April, 1809, are similai- 
in principle : but it cannot be pretended that they are equally 
obnoxious in their effects. It is truly stated in the report, that 
the order of November, 1807, intei-dicted the trade of neutrals 
to France, to the allies of France, to countries at war with 
England, and to countries from which tlie British flag was exclu- 
ded. The order of April, 18U9, applies only to the trade with 
>' ranee, with Holland as far as the Ems, and with a small part 
of the north of Italy. Again, the order of November, 1807, 
prohibits all trade in articles the produce or manufacture of the 
interdicted countries. Nothing of this is found in the order of 
April, 1809. In truth, tiie British order existing when we de- 
cTared war, though a great let and liindsrance to us, did not jus- 



14 

lily the ( onclubiou drawn by the commiltec, that the Brilish go- 
vernment had completely usurped the dominion of the ocean, 
find forbid all trade. A wide spread of commerce was left un- 
touched by British regulations or orders ; and if we credit the 
administration, that which was interdicted, was neither inviting 
to our merchants, noi' desirable for the country. 

Thus standing the charge against Great-Britain, I will now, 
as in the case of blockades, examine whether the order in 
council of April, 1809, was a reasonable cause of war, and if it 
remains so? 

War, being one of the severest calamities that ever scourged 
human kind ; carrying in its train every vice, and laying a 
foundation for the commission of every crime ; it follows, that 
the nation which commences it, should act but from necessity. 
If just to itself, it should not only be certain, that its opponent 
is clearly wrong, but also that it is itself clearly right. Again, 
the agents in the government having the power to make war, 
are not true to their trust, if in addition to the causes of war, 
they do not look to the consequences and effects of it. If an 
evil exists, it ought to be certain that war will be a remedy for 
^'t, and that the good to be acquired, will more than balance (ho 
injuries to result from the war. 

In examining therefore this, and the other avowed causes of 
the war, whether they were, or are just and reasonable, I wish 
to be distinctly understood, as settling the case with this peo- 
ple and nation. If there is a wrong done to them by the or- 
tlers in council, before, as their agent, 1 will consent to carry 
on u war for this cause, I must be satisfied that the wrong in 
practice is of sufficient magnitude to justify war; that the war 
is to afford a remedy for the evil ; and that the remedy is not 
^vorse than the disease. A paper blockade of the Island of 
Tristan d'Acunha, or an order in council, prohibiting a cornmer- 
-cial intercourse with that august sovereign, Jonathan Lambert, 
and his four subjects, however much in principle it may inter- 
fere Avith our rights, will never gain my consent, to a war either 
with Great-Britain or France. 

In considering this cause of war, we are necessarily led to 
view the orders in council, in connexion with the French de- 
■crees. Taken separately, and without regard to the causes 
"which letl to them, or the reasons alleged by each nation for 
their continuance, the French decrees and the British orders 
are undoubted causes of war. Both nations, however, sought 
for a justification, in the conduct of their adversary, and the 
■submission of neutrals. It is not perhaps material to ascertain 
which was the first aggressor, in this novel system of warfare ; 
tjut if it was, and I have justly explained, the blockading order 
of May, 1806, or if that order was fairly understood by Mr. 
Monroe, and by the committee of foreign relations, it would 
seem to follow, that France took the first step, in this war or 
our rights and interests. 



BjC that as it may, tliis government has by its embargo and 
non-intercourse laws, and the offers made to the belligerent^, 
under them, considered hotii so much in the wrong, as to re- 
i'lise to select either for an enemy in exclusion of the other, 
while" tJie obnoxious acts of both remained. This, sir, neces- 
sarily leads to an examination, v.hethcr the French dt-creea 
were revoked, Avhen we were called upon to declare war against 
flrcat-Britain. I speak the settled and firm conviction of my 
owji mind, when I say they were not. 

I have on a former occasion attempted to show, that the Pre- 
sident was not authorised to issue his proclamation of the 2d of 
November, 1810, and tliat Congress ought not to have passed 
the non-importation law, of the 2d of March, 181 1, the two actJf 
which were the precursors of this war, because the note of the 
l)uke of Cadore of the 5th of August, 1810, was not, and was not 
intended to be, a repeal of the French decrees. Without mean- 
ing to repeat what was then urged, I will briefly examine the 
practices of the French cruizcrs, the decisions of the French 
courts, and the declarations of the French govenmienl, in rela^- 
tion to the decrees, since the pretended revocation. 

Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to bring into this dis- 
cussion the decrees of Bayoime and Rambouillet, which more 
than volumes speak the disposition of the French ruler to- 
wards us ; and which at one time appeared to have made a deep 
and lasting impression on the adminisiration. I cannot but re- 
collect the declaration of Secretary Smith, in his address to the 
people, that " on the 2()th of Febriuiry, 1811, the French go- 
vernment did officiallij^ and formally, through their minister, 
IMr. Serrurier, communicate to this government their fixed 
determination, not to restore the property tnat had been so seiz- 
ed." And when I do recollect this, and bring to mind also that 
the information was not given to the national legislature, before 
the passage of the non-intercourse law, and has never yet been 
hiid before us by the executive, I dare not trust myself to speak 
of it. 

Neither, sir, is- it my intention, in any manner, to bring into 
question the motives of the President, m issuing his proclama- 
tion, or of the members of this and the other branch of the 
legislature, who voted for the non-intercourse law. I am will- 
ing to believe, that the executive, when he issued the proclama- 
tion, ami congress, when it passed that law, which was in efTcc': 
to validate the proclamation, acted under the impression that 
the French decrees were revoked : but I must believe also, 
that in this instance they were deceived, by the arts and cun- 
ning of Uic French government. Having been an actor in the 
scenes which preceded the non-importation law, 1 cannot, how- 
ever, when I view them, with the light since afforded by the 
gentleman who was at the head of the department of State, ac- 
quit the President of all blame. INIr. Smith, in his address, 
stStc^ some tl)ing5 v.hlch "we all know to be true. We kno-y 



IG 

that much doubt existed in Uiis house and nation, with respect 
to the effect of the French note, and the intention of the French 
government : and we know also, that the non-importation law 
"was delayed on account of the arrival of the new French minis- 
ter, who it was confidently expected would be able to dispel 
our doubts. Sir, the minister came, and we received no infor- 
mation. How this happened, has been explained by Mr. Smith. 
He had a conference with Mr. Scrrurier, and prepared a note, iii 
order to obtain his formal answer, among other things, to the 
question, whether the decrees had been revoked, and what ex- 
planation he was authorized to give on the subject. Let Mr. 
Smith inform you how this was received by the President.— 
" But waiting on the President with it (the note, and on the 
20th of February,) and after haimig refiorted to him verbally 
the result of the conference, I was to my astonishment told by 
him, tliat it would not be expedient to send to Mr. Serrurier any 
such note. His deportment throughout this interview evinced 
ii high degree of disquietude, which occasionally betrayed him 
*nto fretful expressions." 

As to the practices of the French cruizeis, we have it in the 
history of the times. From accounts not contradicted, and 
which cannot with truth be contradicted, we know that the 
French armed vessels, public as well as private, and in every 
sea, continued their aggressions on our commeixe, under the 
principles of the decrees, notwithstanding the pretended revoca- 
tion. When told of the revocation, their answer was a smile of 
contempt for our credulity. But without resorting to report 
and general history, we have a document from the state depart- 
ment, which establishes these depredations ; I mean the re- 
port of captures laid on our table on the 6th of July last. In 
this we have given to us a list of forty-five captures, made by 
the French, since the 2d of November, 1810; of the vessels 
thus taken, eight are expressly said to have been burnt or sunk 
at sea by a French squadron. The papers relative to the 
French burnings, went to the department through this house, 
and we know, that in some instances, the certificate of the 
French commander accompanied the representations, proving; 
that he acted under orders issued after the 2d of Novenber. 

This report of captures I am sorry, sir, to have it to remark, 
does not comprehend all the cases of French depredations on 
our commerce, after the date of the proclamation of Novem^ 
ber. As it was made up from communications by individuals^ 
this was in some measure to have been expected ; but it was 
not to be expected that any cases known in the office of state 
would have been omitted ; and yet so is the fact. Among the 
papers which accompanied the President's message of the last 
session, is a list from our agent in France, of American ves- 
sels taken by French privateers since the 1st of November, 
1810, and carried into the ports of France. In it we ivave with 
others the Robinson Ova, the Neptune, the Two Brothers, and 



17 

tae Zebra, not one of which is mentioned in the report. Add 
fcd to this, we know the protests and papers which went from 
this house, proved that the French squadron destroyed nearly 
thirty American vessels, instead of eight, as represented by the 
l-cport. 

As to the decisions of the French prize courts ; it will be re- 
collccred that Mr. Russell, in his letter to the Secretary of State, 
of the 8th of May, 1811, says, " it may not be improper to I'e- 
mark, that no American vessel, captured since the 1st of No- 
vember, has yet been released, or had a trial." It is not neces- 
sary, therefore, to go further back. In the message of April 
23d, 1812, relative to captures of vessels in the Baltic sea, we 
have from our agent, Mr. Warden, three cases of condemna- 
tion by the council of prizes at Paris, on the lOth September, 
1811 ; the captures having been made hi 181 1. The ship Julian, 
with her cargo> was declared good prize, because, among other 
reasons, " that she was visited by several English war vessels ;" 
and the ship Hercules, because " that it was impossible sfie was 
not visited by the enemy's ships of war, in approaching ihe 
Isle of Anholt." In all the determinations of the i rench 
Courts, as far as we have any knowledge of them, the princi- 
ples of the Berlin and Milan decrees have been recognized 
and enforced. 

As to the acts and declarations of the French government : 
It has been more than once urged, that the admission of some 
of our vessels inio France was a proof of the revocation of the 
decrees ; and yet, Sir, Mr. Russel, in his letter of May, which 
I have just mentioned, declares that the vessels whose entry 
nad been allowed, had come direct from the United States, 
without having done or submitted to any known act which 
would have subjected them to the operation of the decrees* 
How then. Sir, can such admission be evidence of the revoca- 
tion ? And how does it happen that the admission, if there was 
H revocation, was to proceed from the Emperor ? 

In the answer of the French Emperor to the deputies from 
Hamburg and Bremen, we find him, on the 20th of March, 
is 11, saying that "the decrees of Berlin and Milan are the 
fundamental laws of my empire ; they cease only to have eflect 
as to those nations which defend their sovereignty and main- 
tain the reUgion of their flag." And what, I pray you. Sir, 
does his majesty mean by this religion of the flag ? It is, that 
the flag, if it does not give character to, shall protect the pro- 
perty under it. It is, that the passengers on board the vessel 
shall be considered as on neutral territory, and not be subject 
to capture. Have we really consented to maintain this religion 
ef our flag ? I hope this is not yet to be numbered among our 
follies. And if we have not, is it not certain that the decrees 
remained in operation against us ? Again, his imperial majesty 
addres5>ed his council of commerce on the 31st March, iSIl, 
wbcnr he told them, and told us, tjijit " tlie decreci of Berlin 



18 

and IVUlan are the fundamental laws ot* my empire. For tJift 
neutral navigation, I consider the flag as an extension of terri- 
tory. The power Avhich suffers its flag to be violated, cannot 
be considered as neutral. The fate of American commerce 
will soon be decided. I will favour it, if the United States con- 
form themst:lve5 to these decrees. In a contrary case, their 
vessels will be driven from my empire." His majesty, then, had 
not come to a determination about our commerce in March, 
1811. Its fate still depended on his good pleasure. He was 
willing not I'd apply the decrees to us, in case we adopted them 
ourselves, and joined him in the v/ar he was v/aging for the 
freedom of the seas. 

If, sir, any doubt on this subject remained, it must now be a.t 
an end. The French decree, with the date of the 28th cf 
April, 1811, but actually made in i812, and communicated by 
our agent to the English government on the 2pih of last May, 
will for ever settle this question. By this paper the decrees of 
Berlin and Milan are " definitively" declared as not existing in 
regard to our vessels. And why i Because they were repeal- 
ed in August, 1810? Not so, but because our lav/ of March, 
1811, was a formal refusal to adhere to a cystem, invading the 
independence of neutral powers, and of their flag. To the 
friends of the liberty, the prosperity, and the reputation, of the 
country, it cannot but be a source of melancholy reflection, to 
find our executive governmen, insisting on the revocation of 
the French decrees, and recommending for such revocation a 
non-intercourse and a v/ar with England ; when in every act of 
the French government, its courts, and its fleets, a direct nega- 
tive is to be found to such revocation. 

When, however, Mr. Chairman, the declarations of the French 
ruler, and the seizure, and condemnation, and destruction of our 
property, have been cited in proof of the existence of the French 
decrees, a distinction by way of apology has been made, between 
the internal and external application of them ; we have been 
told that they existed against us merely as municipal regula- 
tions. What, municipal regulations to authorize and to justify 
the captures and the burnings on the Atlantic, and the captures 
and the condemnations on the Baltic ! We shall look in vain for 
such a distinction, as coming from our good friend, J^'apoleor^ 
the just. He makes none such. He has not yet descended thus 
to trifle on this suliject. 

But what are the municipal regulations to which we are so 
willing to submit ? They are, according to the Milan decre*- 
that every vessel which shall submit to be searched by an Eng- 
lisii ship, or that sails from or to an English port, or from or t'^ 
their colonics, or coiuUrles occupied by their troops : and ac- 
cording to the Berlin decree, all merchandise coming fron». 
English manufactories and colonies, is lawful prize. These 
regulations are to roni?.in as long: as Euiijland continues to deny 



19 

•tno iiL\iujability of ihe flag"; or in other words, shall deny ^l 
the flag of a neutral shall protect the property of an enemy. 

Do we wish to know in what country these municipal regula- 
tions are to operate ? The French note on the breaking out of 
the war with Russia, will give us some information on this 
head. The Duke of Bassano, the French minister of foreign 
relations, on the 25th of April, 1812, addressed a paper to Count 
JRomanzow, chancellor of Russia, from which I will give you one 
or two extracts.—" Count — !4is majesty the emperor of Rus- 
sia, had acknowledged at THsi( the principle, that the present 
generation should not have looked to the enjoyment of happi- 
ness, but on the ground that the nations in the full enjoyment 
of their rights, might give themselves up freely to the exercise- 
of their industry : that the independence of their flag should 
be inviolable ; that the independence of their flag was a right be- 
longing to tliem, and its protection a reciprocal duty of the one 
towards the other ; that they were not less bound to protect the 
inviolability of their flag, than that of their territory ; that.if a 
power cannot, without ceasing to be neuter, allow its ter- 
ritory to be taken away by one of the belligerent powers, so 
neither can it remain neuter in permitting to be taken from un- 
der the protection of its flag, by one of the belligerent powers, 
the property which the other has placed there : that all powers 
consequently have the rigiu of exucting, that nations pretend- 
ing neutrality, should cause their flag to be respected in 
the same manner as they enforce respect to their territory ; that 
so long as England, persisting in this system of war, should dis- 
avow the independence of any flag upon the seas, no power 
which is possessed of coast, can be neuter with respect to Eng- 
land." — " The emperor Alexander off"ered his mediation to ilje 
English government, and engaged, if this government would 
not consent to conclude peace upon the principle of acknow- 
ledging that the flags of all powers should enjoy an equal and 
perfect independence upon the seas, to make common cause 
with France, to summon in concert with her, the three courts 
of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon, to close their pons 
against the English, to dcclaie war against England, ar.d to in- 
sist upon the adoption of the same measure by the various pow- 
ers." — " Sweden had refused to shut her ports against England ; 
and Russia, in conformity to the stipulations of Tilsit, had de- 
clared war against her.'' The great complaint against Russia, 
and the principal cause of the present war, us collected from 
this paper, is the permission to bring into Russia the produce 
of English colonies under foreign or neutral flags. 

These municipal decrees, so called by our administration, 
ihcreforc, are, or are to be, as extensive as the conthicnt. All 
nations arc to protect the religion of their flags. Any nation 
refusing or omitting to do this, loses its neutral character, and 
jvar is to be made upon it. Are these indeed mere municipal 

'eguladoni, ? Have we no interests in thesc^ questions j no 



20 

1 i'glits to claim or protect ?-— The events of the last twenty years 
have been such, as, if not to stupify, to astonish and paralyze the 
human mind. We lose the enormity of the conduct of the great 
despot of Europe, in the splendour of his achievements, and suc- 
cess of liis enterprises. How else are we to account for the in- 
difierence with which we hear of his depredations on our pro- 
perty and his violations of our rights ? How else does it hap- 
pen, that we so carelessly receive, or make apologies for, hi-^ 
outrages on our people and nation ? 

To sum up all in a few words. The president was mistaken 
■when he issued his fatal proclamation, and we were equally mis- 
taken when we passed the non-intercourse law. The French 
decrees were not revoked. And we were called upon, by no 
duty to France or ourselves, to declare war against Great-Bri- 
tain, on account of the orders in council. In this point of view, 
it is not necessary to have reference to the diplomatic warfare 
of last year, between our secretary of state and the British mi- 
nister, then in this country ; nor to inquire what kind of revo- 
cation was demanded by England. To all inquiries of this kind, 
the obvious answer is, that there was no revocation of any kind 
by France. 

But it seem.s, to some gentlemen, that all this investigation, 
and indeed any investigation, on the subject, is useless. The 
honour and interest of the country called for this war. Sir, a 
well regulated sense of honour is a proud trait in the character 
of a nation, as well as in that of an individual ; but let us not 
take tinsel for gold. Much has been said about submission, and 
the disgrace, individual and national, attending it. Is it not said, 
and is'there not some foundation for the remark, that war with 
Great-Britian, in the state of our relations with France, was sub- 
mission to the arts, or at least the duplicity, of Bonaparte ? If 
to maintain the chastity of our character, was indeed our only 
object, we ought to have had all doubts renjoved as to the acts 
and intentions of the French emperor. 

Was the pretended revocation by France an act of justice to us, 
or at all calculated for our benefit ; or was it not a mere lure to 
lead us on to a wai" with England ? The depredations on the 
high seas were continued to the extent of French power, and 
our commercial intercourse with France was fettered with new 
duties and oppressive regulations. In the letter of instructions 
from the secrctaiy of state, Mr. Monroe, of the 26th of July, 
1811, to our present minister in France, this subject is present- 
ed in a fair point of view. After remai-king that it had been ex- 
pected that our trade with France would have been placed oo a 
fair footing, he says, H appears from documents in his office, 
" that our commerce has been subjected to the greatest dis- 
couragement, or rather, to the most oppressive restraints.'' 
" In short, that tlic ordinary usages of commerce between friend- 
ly nations were abandoned." — " If the ports of France and hei- 
allies are not opened to the commerce of the United States ct 



21 

a liberal scale, and on fair eonditions, of what avail to them, ir 
may be asked, will be the revocations of the British orders in 
council?" Sir, 1 have nothing to add to these observations; 
they are strong in character, and not more strong than just. 
Would to heaven I could see a correspondent spirit in the 
scraps and morsels, which have been cast upon us, of the mea- 
gre communications of the man who was thus instructed. 
Nearly eighteen months have now passed, since this man, whe 
" had the most flattering things said to him fit)m the Eniperor, 
relative to his appointment," reached France, and yet to this 
day we are ignorant of the great value of his labours. But if 
what he has done remains unknown, what he has not done is not 
Ko. The discouragements and restraints on our commerce re- 
main as he found them. 

If the British orders in council were a cause for declaring the 
war, are they a cause at this time for continuing it ? Sir, the or- 
ders were revoked about the time we made the war, and though 
much has been said about conditions annexed to the repeal, ren- 
dering it unacceptable to this country, yet the administration 
understand it differently. The President, in his message at the 
commencement of this session, admits that the repeal was " sus- 
ceptible of explanations meeting the views of this government." 
This cause of war has therefore vanished. 

IMPRESSMKJ^-^r OF SE.4MEA\ 
The injury done to our seamen under the British practice of 
impressment, was also made a cause of the war, and to the eye, 
at least, it is the only one which now remains. 

IVIr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject is attended with 
adventitious difficulties, growing out of the times and the state 
of the country. The public mind, in some sections of the union, 
is in such a feverish state on this account, from tales oft told of 
bondage, worse than negro sla\i8ry, and of condemnation with- 
out trial, that the person who is willing to " hear the other par- 
ty," is at once branded with foreign partialities, and tlucatencd 
with the trial by mob. Besides, Sir, it is intimated tlmt a nego- 
ciation is to be had, or may possibly be attempted, which may be 
aflccted by an open discussion of the topic. In point of duty, I 
feel myself called upon to take some notice of the subject, but 
my view of it will be less perfect than in a different situation I 
should think desirable. 

The President, in the war message, thus introduces the sub- 
ject—" British cruizers have been in the continued practice of 
violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and 
of seizing and carrying off persons sailing linder it ; not in the exr 
ercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against 
an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects." 
As this does not present the case in its true light, 1 shall, for the 
purpose of fairly bringing to view the conflicting claims of the 
two nation?^, give you an extract from tlie letter of Mr. Madison 



..J Mr. Monroe, oi the 5th of January, 1804, containing instiuc- 
tions for a treaty with Great-Britain. " With this exception 
(persons in the mililaiy service of an enemy) we consider a 
?ieutraifag on the high &eac., as a safeguard to those saUing lui. 
dcr it. Great-Britain, on the contrary, asserts a right to search 
for and ieize her own suOjccts ; and under that cover, as cannot 
but happen, are often seized and taken off, citizens of the Uni- 
ted States, and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries* 
navit^ating the high seas, under the protection of the American 
aag.°' 

The claim then on the pai t of the British is, that in time of 
war tbcy have a right to enter neutral merchant vessels on the 
high seas, to search tor and seize their subjects, being seamen. 
On our part it is, that on the high seas the flag shall cover and 
protect all sailing under it, v.hethcr British subjects or American 
citizens. The.':-e are distinctly the claims of right on the part 
of the tvt'o nations, and I shall so considex* them, without regard 
to practice apart from right. 

One or tv.'o remarks, Sir, before I enter upon the subject. The 
first is, that I do not mean to moot the point, relative to the rights 
of our naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties towards 
them. But this I will say, that I am willing to give them all 
the protection which the situation of the country and its true in- 
terests will justify. I know that the unruly passions and the 
meddling dispositions, of some foreigners, have raised prejudices 
in the minds of many persons against all foreigners. But I know 
also, and I speak without reference to political ojpinions or pre- 
judices, that aniong our naturalized citizens, are to be found 
men, and many men too, of great worth and respectability, and 
"Who are extensively useful to the country These men have 
my good will, and it is certainly my wish, that they should be 
fostered and protected, as far as it can be done, without putting 
at hazard the great interests and the permanent welfare of the 
country. 

But, Sir, to this class of our citizens, the claim that they are 
to be protected on the high seas by our flag, is really of little 
importance. Our claim never was, and I am sure never will be, 
that they are to be protected, if they put themselves within the 
power of their former sovereign, by going to his ports, or plac- 
ing themselves on his territories. And yet such is the state 
of the commerce of the world, that it can scarcely happen in a 
mercantile voyage, in this or the other hemisphere, that the ves- 
sel will not at some time be in a British port, and the crew on 
British ground : our right of flag will not then save our adopted 
citizens from impressment. For the slight benefit, therefore, to 
our naturalized citizens, which can arise under our claim, if es^ 
tablished, I am sure the well-meaning and reasonable part of them 
%vill not ask the country to continue the war on their account. 

Another remark which I wish to make is, that I am most 
decidedly the friend, nay. Sir, if you please, the partisan, ef the 



2a 

ieamen of the countr5'<^ I have no doubt that this nation is de;;- 
tined to be a g^'eat maritime power ; and that, in limes not vtry 
far distant, we are to owe ovir prosperity, as a commercial peo- 
ple, and possibly, under providence, our security, to our seamen . 
I am therefore a friend to " seamen's rights," properly under^ 
stood and iairly enforced ; but this shall not blind me to the 
rights of others. Besides, in a war to be carried on for seauien 
alone, and that too on the abstract question of the right of flag-, 
i can see great danger to the seamen in their just claims to pro- 
tection ; and I must beg their friends, in and out of this house, 
to reflect before they act. As surely as the war is continued on 
this ground alone, so surely will seamen become unpopular, and 
their rights be neglected. When the evils of the war press upon 
the country, and press they will ; when the many lives sacrific 
ed, and the countless millions expended, shall be brought to 
view, is it not to be apprehended that seamen and their claims 
*vill be rcmembered,only as the causes of the scenes of expense 
jiid blood through which we are to pass ? It is r.ot dealing fairlv 
with our seamen, to make them the scape-goats of this war. 

The British then claim the right, in time of war, to take their 
aeamen out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas 

Is this claim a nvvcl one ? That the claim is novel, is certainly 
intimated by the committee of foreign relations, when they say 
that the impressment of which we complain, is " a practice 
which has been unceasingly maintained by Great-Britain in the 
wars to which .she has been a party sir.ce our revolution." In- 
deed it has been most roundly asserted, and by many it is be • 
lieved, that the British claim was made for the first time afte; 
«ur war; that it originated in views hostile to our commerce 
and maiitime rij^hts ; and that in practice it is only brought to 
feear upon us. In truth, however, whatever may be the justice 
wf the thiim, U is not u recent one. It has, in a greater or lesr. 
degree, been practibed on in all the wars in which England ha' 
been engaged for the two last centuries. 

The instructions to armed ships is not frequently made public •, 
fcut it so happens, that we have in print an instruction ou this 
very point, givwi in 164t>, by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord 
High Admiral of England, to Sir John Pennington, which goes 
beyond the present claim. " As you meet with any men of war, 
merchants, or other ships, belonging to any foreign prince or 
state, or in any road where you, or any of his majesty's fleet, 
may happen to come, you are to send to see whether there be 
any of his majesty's subjects on board ; and if any seamen, gun- 
ners, pilots, or marines, (whether English, Scotch, or Irish,) be 
found on board, you are to cause such of his majesty's subjects 
to be taken forth, and so disposed of as they shall be forthcom- 
ing, to ansv.er their contempt of his majesty's proclamation in 
tluit kind." These inLtri'.ctions were moditied in the reign of 
Chailcs the second, !co as to exclude public armed vesselaj and 
witJi •.' "s inodific; • ; , . vme doAv^ to the present 



24 

times, if It were at Hil necessary to the purposes of my argti' 
nrent, I might show that this right has been exercised both to- 
wards France and Holland, long before we had existence as a 
nation. Their vessels have been searched, and British seamen 
taken from them. But enough has been said to prove that the 
claim, if unjust, is not novel. 

Is the claim fieculiar to the British ? I am justified in saying, 
that this claim, in time of war, to search for and seize seamen in 
neutral merchant vessels, on the high seas, has been made and 
exercised by every maritime nation in Europe. To be more 
particular — I assert, and stand ready to prove, that it has been 
made and enforced by France as well as England, and is so 
now. It would be a waste of time to g-o very much at large into 
the French usages on this subject. I propose to do little more 
than to refer to one or two French ordinances, and then show 
from our state papers their practical application to us. 

By the French laws, and they are ancient laws, the seamen of 
the country are all classed, and enrolled, and licensed. In 1784, 
an edict was made, which is still in force, declaring, that any 
classed seaman, -who shall, in time of peace, be found serving in. 
foreign ships, shall be sentenced to 15 days' confinement, and re* 
duced to the lowest wages, and serve two years extraordinary at 
the lowest rate ; but those who, in time of war, shall be arrested 
in foreign ships, or passing into foreign countries, shall be sen- 
tjcnced to three years' service in the gallies." Under the autho- 
rity of this, and similar ordmances, the French have taken their 
seamen out of our vessels, and in some instances our seamen 
with them. 

Mr. Chairman, the first proof relative to the French practice 
which I shall lay before the committee, is the impressment do- 
cument of January last, known to the American people as thf; 
6 5 7 document. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, at the 
close of the introductory report, says, " it is equally impossible, 
from the want of precise returns, to make an accurate report of 
the names or number of citizens of the United States^ ivho have 
been compelled to enter into the French service., or are held in- 
cafitivity under the authority oj" (hat gover7iment, whether taken 
from vessels captured on the high seas, or seized in rivers, 
ports, or harbours; the names of a few only, greatly below the 
number believed to be so detained, being within the knowledge 
of this department. A detail therefore is not attempted, with 
respect to this part of the call of the House of Representatives." 
Yes, sir, it is known to the administration, that some of our citi 
zens have been compelled to enter into the service of the French 
Emperor, while others are held in captivity by him. Ask, hov;- 
ever, for their names, and you have for answer, that all the per 
sons detained are not known to the government, and therefore it 
cannot he material that you should have the names of any. Say 
to gentlemen, here is a case of American rights violated, ancJ 
you will be told, that the injury, in practice, is not of sufficient 



25 

importaixce to justify strong measures against the French go- 
vernment. Be it S'). But attempt to prove to the same !>entle- 
men, that the practical operation of British blockades and orders 
in council, is not such as to require war, you will then hear, 
*'i.it it is necessary to fight about tlic principle. 

I have one other paper to lay before the committee, on this 
subject. For some years back, the information about Freixh 
impressments, has been general and vague, or altogether with- 
held. Formerly this was otherwise. In a report respecting 
the impressment of seamen in 1797, made by the Secretary of 
State to this house, on the 27th of February, 1798, we have the 
names of upwards of twenty American citizens, taken out of 
American vessels, on the high sear,, by French privateers. We 
have more, Sir. This 'jauie report states, that two French sea- 
men named Lewis, had been impressed from on board the 
American ship Bryscis, by a French Commodore's ship ; that 
Francis Gibbons, a native of France, but married and resident 
at New-London, in Connecticut, was impressed from the Ameri- 
can ship Edward, at Rochefurt, by authority of the French re- 
public, and put on board a French ship of war ; and that Henry 
Doughty, an American, v/us impressed at sea, from the Ancri- 
can brig Elsa, by the French frigates Lapancey and Thetis. 
I could instance otiicr cases, but these are sufficient to sho\v, 
that neither the claim nor the exercise of it is peculiar tc the 
British. 

It is a claim altogether Jinaupfiorted by reason. As I under- 
stand the nations who contend for this right to seize their sea- 
men, it is founded on the principle of national l.iw, which gives 
to every government a right to the service of its subjects in 
time of war. I meddle not. Sir, with the question, who isyor 
who is not, a subject ; but as long as a person is a subject, and 
owes alleg-iauce, and may demand protection, so long has the 
eommuniiy a claim on him, when the coimtry is in distress or 
danger. And this, not by any municipal regulation, properly 
so called, but by general law. It is a right necessarily grow ing 
out of a state of society. 

If this is a right, then there must be a I'emcdy also. To al- 
loAV that a sovereign has a claim to the services of his subject, 
is necessarily to admit, that he has the power in some way to 
enforce such claim. As to sailors, the right is a dead letter, 
unless search and seizure on l)oard nc\itral mercliantmen is al- 
lowed. In every war, if the principle is established, that the 
flag shall protect all sailing under it, seamen would be drawn 
from the <:ountry and its service into ne\iU'al employ. High 
wages, witli security against the hazards and ckuigers of war, 
would overbalance considerations of general duty. Let it bs 
known to tlie seamen of England or of France, that they may 
safely sail under the American Hag during the existing wai', and 
sny word for it, they will come to yon, to the extent of yotrr 
ability to employ tlicm. 

4 



26 

In the case of a national ship, the seaman enters under the go-» 
vernment ; and il. is therefore fair to presume, and ousrht to be 
presumed, that there is no violation of right, on breach of duty. 
If a seaman of a belligerent, or a deserter, is employed, the comi- 
ty of nations, and the respect due to governments, make a I'e-^ 
quest for a discharge or delivery necessary. But in this case, 
it the demand is refused, a national right is violated, and it be- 
comes a k gitimate cause of war. Not so with a merchant ves- 
sel. I'he sovereign is not concerned with the crew or the voy- 
age. No duty exists not to employ foreigners. If the com- 
mander refuses to surrender any one of his crew, although he 
is the sui^ject of the demanding nation, and even a deserter, the 
government is not concerned. The refusal is no cause of war. 
Sr izure is therefore the only remedy. It is, bir, unnecessary to 
view the subject in all its bearings; what has been said was in- 
tended merely to show that there are some grounds for the 
claim. 

Js it our real interest to opfiose this claim ; in other words, 
would it be a substantial and permanent benefit to this country, 
to establish the principle, that the flag should in all cases, cover 
and protect the person ? To question this, may seem strange to 
gentlemen ; and yet. Sir, after mucli reflection, I have almost 
brought myself to believe, that it would neither comport with 
the intei'est of our own seamen, nor with that of the nation, to 
have the right of flag, as we are made to contend for it, insert' 
ed in the law of nations. 

The recent French doctrine, that the flag shall cover the pro- 
perty to whomsoever it may belong, like this, that the flag shall 
protect the person, had at one time many advocates in this 
country, and there are nOt wanting some, even at this day, who 
think it altogether favourable to us. Yet, Sir, our experience 
is sufficient to satisfy any ^practical man, that it is our interest 
to adhere to the old rule on this subject In peace it has been 
the horn of plenty, which has poured riches into the coim- 
try. When the French colonists could no longer cover their 
property by neutral flags, they were driven in consequence to 
sell to our merchants. All the profits on the European sale, 
and it was certainly great, became ours, and tne ship-owners 
had the advantages of a double freight, as the merchant was en- 
abled to fill the vessel in, as well as out. If the colonists could 
have sent their property home without danger of capture, they 
•would have done it. The profit to the merchant would have 
been lost, and the ship owner would have had an outward freight 
only. 

In war, Sir, we find the old doctrine equally necessary to us. 
If Great-Britain is vulnerable to us, it is essential in her com- 
xnerce Avith her colonies and allies in this hemisphere, which 
parsing by our door, is thrown in our way. But ii the flag is to 
give a character to the property, all she has to do, is to borrow 
^ Spanish or Portuguese vessel, and her commerce is placed be- 



27 

J ond our (^rasp or power. We arc too apt to form general con' 
elusions from inclividtial caaes, and to suffer our judtjmcuL to 
be misled by fine speculations, which favour our wishes. This 
religion of the flag, has many charms for those who will not suf- 
fer themselves to tliink of consequences ; when, however, it is 
viewed with the lights of experience, tiie charm vanishes. \Vc 
then sec the advantage and nectssity of old rules, and are willing 
to be regulated by then), 1 have said, bir, the right of flag doe^s 
not appear calculated to promote the real interests of our own 
seamen. The interest of the sailor is to have good wages, and 
constant employment; and he is sure with us to have both the 
one and tlie otlier, if foreign seamen do not interf'.rc with him. 
If foreigners are admitted to be covered and protected by our 
flag, it must follow, from the low wages in Great-Britain, and the 
liability to impressment, that English sailors will come in 
shoals to this country. They will by this competition lessea 
the wages of our native sailors, if they do not absolutely drive 
them from the ocean, for want of employment 

Mr. Chairman, it may seem absurd to say, that the security of 
the great body of our seamen has been found in the British 
practice of impressment, with all its evils: and yet there is 
some foundation for such an opinion. Our own regulations 
place all seamen, native and foreign, on the same footing, and 
allow them equal privileges : is it not then fair to infer, that but 
for the danger of being impressed by their own nation, we 
should have been overrun by Britisli sailors, to the great injury 
of our own sailors ? In truth, Sir, in principle, the operation of 
the British claim is favourable to American seamen. All they 
require, is a regulation of the practice, so as to furnish them 
■with a reasonable security against impressment. 

In a national point of view, the riu;ht claimed by the Europe- 
an maritime nations, appears all important to this country; and 
I venture to predict, that those who witness the close of the 
next half century, will see us practising on this very claim, and 
if necessary, fighting for it. There can be no d( ubt, Sir, that 
we are to be a great maritime power, as we are already a great 
commercial nation. Indeed, to continue the latter, we must be- 
come the former. Our future wars will be maritime wars.— 
The business of the Canadas and the Floridas, according to the 
common course of events, will settle itself, and if we meet a 
foe, it must be on llie ocean. 

To Carry on a maritime war, we must have ships ; but ships, 
without seamen to navigate and fight them, will be useless. It 
will therefore be absolutely necessary to settle on some princi- 
ple, which will give us as much command over our seamen, on 
their element, as we have over our landsmen on shore. With- 
out meaning to intimate that we will or ought to resort to the 
European practice of impressment, yet, when we seriously de- 
teriiiine on having a navy, we siiall find it necessary to look to 
some regulation, which will bring our sailors within the countrj 



28 

iii every war, so as to make it their interest to go into our ser- 
vice. Wc shall have no means to prevent their accepting the 
bribes of neutrals, high wages, and safe employment, but by 
seizing them, \vhen found sailing under neutral flags, after they 
shall be recalled. 

If, Sir, there is any thing in this course of reflection, and I 
do think there is, then so far from being bound in duty to the 
nation or to our seamen, to continue the war with Great-Britaiit' 
on the abstract question of right, we are ourselves interested in 
preserving the very right claimed by that nation. What we 
have to contend fur, is iu reality, that the practice by the Bri- 
tish, and all other nations, should be so I'egulated, as to afford to 
our sean\en a reasonable degree of security. For as to perfect 
and absolute security, their habits, and the nature and scene of 
their employment, renders, that impossible. Their service will 
of course bring them, and that frequently, AvHhin the British 
teri'itories, where our doctrine of the religion of the flag will 
not protect them. In point of fact, a considerable number of 
tJie impressments reported to us, took place on British ground, 
and not on the high seas. 

If this right, or claim of right, however, is made a mere pre*. 
text by any nation, to seize and detain our seamen, I am willing 
to allow that it would be a cause of war. But even in this case, 
war ought not be waged, until we had done our duty to our sea- 
men and the oftcnding nation, l)y making suitable regulations, 
to prevent the employment of the seamen of such nation. Have 
we done this, as respects Great-Britain ? Perhaps some such 
regulation is to be found, in the law which defines what vessel 
is an American vessel, and which, as such, is entitled to hoist 
our flag Look at it. Sir. According to the act of December, 
17y2, an American ship, is one Avholly owned by an American 
citizen, and commanded b^' a person also a citizen. The crew 
may be all foreigners, all Englishmen, and if you please, all 
English deserters. In this, therefore, we find no security to the 
British government. 

But we liuve also the law of May, 1796, which provides, that 
the collectors may register seamen, calling themselves Ameri- 
can, and grant certificates of citizenship. Out of this law, it 
is presumed, has grown the practice of granting pi'otections, as 
they are called ; papers procured from notaries and magistrates, 
oft-times on the most barefaced perjuries, and always consider- 
ed as a species of negotiable property for value received. Sir, 
these protections, in their abuse, are a scandal to the nation. — 
It has made false swearing an employment, and the granting of 
false papers a business. The price of such a paper, is as well 
known in the great sea-port towns, as is that of yovu' stocks.- — 
All ages, and complexions, and tongues, may have this badge of 
citizenship, by paying the charges in such cases provided. If 
this, however, was not so; if protections were only granted to 
real Americans, it is difficult to see, how this is to prevent tht^ 



29 

employment of British sailors. It is not necessary that the 
persons navigating an American vessel should have ihem. 

This act oi ours was presented to the British government, 
by Mr. King, in January, 1797, and Lord GrenvillCjOn the 27th 
of March following, in a manner highly conciliatory, and cer- 
tainly with much force, stated specihc objections to the law.— 
The executive, when, in July last, he answered the call of the 
Senate, for papers relative to impressments, omitted this letter 
of Lord Grenville, but he gives a letter from the then secreta- 
tary of state, to our minister at the British Court, of the third 
of October, I7y7, in which the force of the objections seems to 
be admitted. " Lord Gicnville's observations on the act of 
Congress for the relief and protection of American seamen, 
present difficulties which demand consideration at the ensuing 
session." Nothing was, however, done at that or any future ses- 
sion. In truth, we have done nothing, to prevent the eniploy- 
ment of Bi itish seamen in our public or private ships ; and 
they arc to be found in both. And yet, with this fact staring us 
in the face, we are called upon to say that the war is altogetlier 
just on our part ! 

It will probably be urged, that the British practice under 
their claim, in its application to us, was sufficitMit to prove, 
that the reclamation of their seamen was not so much the ob- 
ject of the British government, as the seizure of our seafaring 
citizens ; that it had become so outrageous, as not only to justi- 
fy, but to require war. — Without, Sir, meaning to excuse or to 
palliate the taking even a cabin boy, if done knowingly and witting- 
ly ; and being willing to admit, that about the period of tne attack 
on the Chesapeake, we had much and serious cause to com- 
plain on the subject, I must be permitted to say, that I have 
not evidence to satisfy me, that when we declared war, the 
practice of the British was such as to prove, that the claim on 
their part was a mere pretext to take our sailors. In truth, I 
believe, if the administration have not deceived themselves on 
this subject, that they have attempted a gross deception on the 
public. 

The instructions given at this day, by the British admiralty 
to a naval commander, on this subject, directs hin), " when he 
meets with any foreign ship or vessel, to send a Ueuteiianl^ to 
inquire whether there may be 9n board of her, any seamen 
who are the subjccls of his majesty ; and if there be, to de- 
mand thtin^ {irovidcd it does not dintress the ahi/i : he is to de- 
mand their wages up to the day ; but he is to do this without 
detaining the vessel longer than shall be necessary, or offering 
any violence to, or in any way ill-treating the ma;Uor or his 
crew." Mr. Monroe may perhaps recognize iii this, the in- 
structions shown to him after his arrangement, and of which 
he declared himself satisfied ; but whether he docs or not, it 
must be conceded, that it provides for a moderate exercis'. of 
the right. The perf,on who is to make the searcli; is an officer 



of some standing ; he is only lo take seamen who are Bviti'A 
subjects, excluding thereby, not merely our citizens, but all 
forc.giiers; and he is not lo take even British seamen, it" by it 
he acbtroys the crew, or endangei's the vessel. Allowing the 
Tight to exist, it is difficult more fairly to regulate its exercise. 

But it may be urged, that the practice of the British com- 
manders docs not correspond with these instructions ; that tliey 
search and seize at large according to their will and pleasure. 
1 know, Sir, that the habits and education ot a military man, not 
unfrcquently make him act as if power and right meant the 
same thing: and I therelore have no doubt that there have 
been abuses. But 1 do most conscientiously believe, that these 
abuses have been greatly magniticd, and are, even by the well 
meaning, vastly overrated. 1 am aware, that 1 shall be refer- 
red to tne inipressi.ient document oi last sessioa. Tnis docu- 
ment. Sir, is so illy understood, and has been tne source ot so 
much misrepresentation, that 1 must be allowed slightly to re- 
vie »v it. 

The Secretary in the report says, that the list transmitted, 
had been received from our agent at London, and '^ contains 
the names of American seamen and citizens w/io have been im- 
pressed and held in bondage in his Britannic majesty's shijis of 
nvar, for the several quarters of 18uy u7id i8iO." — The list is 
headed, " A return or list of American seamen and citizens, 
■who have been impressed and held on board of his Britannic 
majcbty's ships of war, from 1st of April to the 3wth of June, 
inclusively," and so of the other quarters. Now the plain 
meaning of this is, if any meaning it has, that the persons 
"Whose names were thus sent to us, were impressed and made 
to serve on board British armed ships, at some period i-n the 
years i809 and 1810. Indeed, this has been so stated in this 
house, and in the administration prints. And yet the most super- 
ficial examination will show, mat this is not true. Let me 
read to you one or two names : '' 4868. David Wiley." In the 
column of the " result of applications and remarks," we have 
this explanation ot his case — " Impressed on shor.e at New 
Brunswick, and taken on board the Plumper, was detained two 
days, when the commander put him on board a vessel bound 
to Aberdeen, from thence worked his passage to London, and 
appeared at this office 29th August, lbu5 ; is evidently an 
American. Discharged." Here then M'e have a man who was 
not on board a British ship in I80j, and whose '' bondage" did 
not probably continue more than two days. 

Again " 4S36. Richard Butler, representing himself of Pe- 
tersburgh, Penn. Impressed in 17y7 at the Cape of Good 
Hope, from the Mercury of Baltimore, and detained on board 
the Garland." Remark. '* Kemainetl on board the Garland 
fwo months, then drafted to the Treniendous, in which he serv- 
ed tivo and an half years, was t en disciiarged ; nas never re- 
cfeived his wages or prize-money ; says he was well used on board 



31 

both ships. Was discharged as an American citizen at the Cape 
of Good-Hofic ; his pay and prize-money lists were givei) to the 
consul at ihe Cape. Discharged." This man, therefore, ac- 
cording to the statement of our consul, so far from having 
been impressed and held on board a British ship in i809, had 
been impressed in 1797, and discharged in 1799. I might, Sir, 
give you many other cases equally strong, but these are suffi- 
cient to prove that, by design or mistake, the document is 
wrongly headed : that the persons named in the list were not 
all on board British ships in i8()9 and 1810: and therefore, that 
in its general results, it docs not show the state of the British 
practice in those years. 

In truth, the list is nothing more than the return of the 
names of persons who, witliiii the year, had applied to Mr. Ly- 
man, our consul and agent for seamen, for protections against 
future, or for his aid in getting released from present, impress- 
ment. It was Ills duly, as 1 do not doubt it was made his inter- 
est, to receive all ajiplications, and wiicn necessary, to lay them 
before the proper Biilish authority. Jew and Greek, Turk an4 
Christian, the growth of our own soil and the produce of other 
countries, all thi-ew themselves upon Mr. Lyman, and he, labour- 
ing in his vocation, granted patents of citizenship, or made his 
claim on the British admiralty. Sir, there is not a man who, in 
practice or l)y inquiry, has made himself acquainted with the 
manner in which this business is transacted, but knows, that ma- 
ny foreigners, who never saw this country, or sailed under its 
flag, have attempted, by application to our agents aljroad, to 
shield themsslves against British impressment. The secretary 
of state, Mr. Monroe, needs no information on this subject, hav- 
ing himself resided in London as our minister. , l6 was the duty 
of our agent to send home some accouiit of his proceedings, and 
I have no objection to his making s\ich a list as we have before 
us. But 1 do object to its being palmed on the* American na- 
tion, as a true history of British impressments affecting our 
people i.«id nation. I pray you look at this list. In the year 
commencing in April, i8U9, and ending in March, I8lu, we 
have about 940 names, and of theiie about 7uO are given with 
blanks in the columns for the — " towns and states of which they 
represent themselves to be citizens" — " when impressed" — 
" where impressed" — ships from whence taken" — " nations" — . 
« masters." — The time and the result of the application are 
only given. And from these entries in Mr. Lyman's book, you 
are called upon to admit, that the applicant was an American, 
and that he was impressed in the vear 1809, l)y the British, oii 
the high seas, out of an American vessel. Really this is asking 
too much, 

Mr. Chairman, 1 have examined the list from April, 1809, to 
April, 1810, with great attention, far the purpose of ascertaining 
the number of impressments, which took place in that year, and 
1 will now mak^ to you one or two statements, which may cast 



32 

sonve liglit on Uie subject of the British practice. The nunibcf 
which by the list appears to have been impressed in that year ia 
one hivndred. It will be understood, that in this number I do not 
include those whose names are carried out in blank as has been 
stated. It is u. certain whether such persons ever were im- 
pressed, and .t all events, it is fair to presume, that their ser- 
vice on board British ships had commenced before 1809, or 
otherwise there could be no difficulty in giving dates. Of the 
100, seventy-six wci-e discharged, and six had deserted, leaving 
less than twenty to be accounted for Another result. Of the 
persons thus taken, 57 were impressed on shore and 43 at sea. 
Again — 30 of these seamen, when impressed, made part of the 
crews of British vessels, and 34, American vessels, and of the 
34, twelve were taken on land, leaving but about 22 persons ta- 
ken from American vessels on the high seas It is possible, 
Sir, that in these statements I may not be perfectly accurate ; 
I am certain, however, that I am substantially so. 

I do not mean to represent that this is a full account of all the 
impressments which took place in 1809 ; on the contrary, I ad- 
mit that it is not. Many impressments were certainly made, of 
persons undeniably British subjects, who would scarcely think 
of applying to Mr. Lyman, and will not therefore be found in 
his book. Many persons also having a right to his interference, 
\vtre not then known to him My object in making these ex- 
planations, was to show that the 6, 0, 5, 7 document does not fur- 
nish such strong evidence of British aggression as has been sup- 
posed. 

The number of our seamen impressed by the British, has 
been so variously represented, that I have, from motives of cu- 
riosity as well as duty, been desirous to arrive at something 
like a reasonable certainty on the subject. We hear of ten, 
twenty, nay, forty thousand of our citizens,' confined in the float- 
ing dungeons of Great-Britain, fighting her battles against their 
will The evidence of this, however, is only to be found in the 
imagination of gentlemen. It is the old story over again of the 
six men in Buckram. In part representing the greatest com- 
mercial state in the union, it may be expected that I have some 
•personal knowledge on this subject, but indeed I have none 
such to give. Is there not in this some proof tliat the evil has 
been magnified ? 1 have sought for information, in quarters 
%vhere only it is to be found, among the shipping merchants and 
ship owners of the country, I will now furnish you with the 
opinion of an intelligent gentleman from Marblehead, whose 
means of information is ample, and whose veracity will not be 
doubted. I mean my friend from Massachusetts, Avho sits be- 
fore me, (Mr. Reed.) He has favoured me with this state- 
ment. 

" In answer to your iniquiry, relative to the seamen of Mar- 
blehead, I have to remark, that the average shipping of tliat 
port for the last twenty years, may be esUmated at about 19u06. 



Uijis, of which it is fair to calculate 10,000 tons were employed 
in foreign commerce, and the residue in the fisheries and in the 
coasting-trade. Allowing six men to every 1 00 tons, wliich is 
tlie usual estimate, it gives an average of 1 176 seamen in all, 
and 600 in our foreign trade each year ; tiie number of seamen 
therefore employed from Marblehead for the last twenty years, 
must have been considerable, say 5000. I have resided at that 
jjlace nearly twenty year*;, and duruig the greater part of the 
time, have been actively engaged in commerce. According to 
my own recollection, aided by that of others who have the best 
means of information, I do not believe that twenty of the sea- 
men of Marblehead, native or naturalized, have been impressed 
by tlie British within the twenty years, and it is not known that 
one has been demanded without being released." 

As there is no reason to suppose, that Marblehead has been 
more fortunate with respect to impressments than other places, 
we have here something, whereby to form an estimate of the 
number of our seamen taken by the British, My own convic- 
tion is, that the American seamen impressed and held by the 
British, at the commencement of this war, did not much ex- 
ceed 500 in all, and certainly did not amount to 1000. Permit 
rae. Sir, to mention one circumstance which speaks loudly on 
this subject. If the practice of impressment had been as out- 
rageous as has been represented, it must have fallen with great 
force on the eastern states, as it is there the mass of o\ir seamen 
are found. We are then to expect much feeling and passion o\x 
this account. The war must be popular when th.e cause of it is 
brought home to every man's door. No such thing, Sir. The 
war is confessedly odious there. It is in states where seamen 
never grew, that the war has its strongest advocates ; it Ls there 
that you principally find the dark pictures of sailors' sufferings, 
and hear the loud and long appeals to the sympathies and pas- 
sions of the people about seamen's rights, and seamen's injuries 

One inquiry more, Mr. Chairman, on the subject of impress- 
ment, and I have done with it. The President, in his war mes- 
sage, says, that no pretext should be left for a continuance of the 
practice, " the British government was formally assured of the 
readiness of the United States to enter into arrangemenis, such, 
as could not be rejected, if the recovery of British bubjects 
were the real and sole object. The communication passed with- 
out effect." The committee of foreign relations are more direct 
'.till : " Its continuance (the praciice of impressment) is the more 
unjustifiable, because the United States have rc/ieaicdly pro- 
posed to the British government an arrangement which would 
secure to it the control of its own people. An exemption of 
the citizens of tne United States from this degrading oppression, 
and their flag from violation, is all they have sought." In these 
passages we have two distinct propositions, that reasonable of- 
fers for an adjustment of this difficult and delicate subject have 
'•eon proffered by the gfivcrnment, meaning snrelv th'* adrrinis- 



34 

tration wliieh commenced, and are -willing to carry on, the war 
on this account ; and that the British government would listen 
to no terms, however well calculated to ;jecure to it the service 
of its own seamen : Is all this true ? 

Is it true that the present executive has attempted to nego- 
ciate with Great-Britian on this subject; that he has communi- 
cated to the British government his willingness and his wish to 
come to an arrangement, which, while it afforded safety to our 
seamen, would secure to that country the services of its seamen ? 
What has been done by him is soon told, and ought to be known. 
The only measure which has come before the public, looking to- 
wards an accommodation, by him, is to be found in the letter from 
Secretary Smith to Mr. Pinckney, of the 20th January, 1810, 
in which the latter is directed to resume the negociation with 
the British government, under the power which had been given 
to Mr. Monroe and himself. In his discussions, he was to be 
regulated by the instructions which had been given to them. 
It is added, " it is however not intended^ that you should cont" 
ynence this negociation, until the requisite satisfaction shall have 
been made in the affair of the Chesafieake." The aff"air of the 
Chesapeake, we all know, was not settled until within a short 
time before the war was declared, and long after the return o^ 
Mr. Pinckney to this country. It follows that Mr. Pinckney could 
not, as most certainly he did not, commence, a negociation. Nc 
terms have been offered, no arrangement has been attempted to 
be effected, by the present executive. He cannot say his " com- 
munications passed without effect," as in fact he made none. 
And yet by him we are carried into a war on this account. 

The President may, however, deem his administration %0' 
far identified with that of his immediate predecessor, as to en- 
title him to the benefit of the offers formerly made Be it so. 
We will then examine the sum and value of the propositions of 
Mr. Jefferson. The instructions to Messrs. Monroe and Pinck^ 
ney, are to be found in a letter to them from Mr. Madison, then 
Secretary of State, of the 17th of May, 1806, in which they arc 
referred to the instructions to Mr. Monroe, of the 5th of Janua- 
ry, 1804, as applicable to a great proportion of the matters com- 
mitted to their johit negociation, and as their guide. In the in- 
structions thsrefore of 1804, we are to find the arrangement 
" repeatedly proposed to the British government," — " which 
would secure to it the control of its own people." 

The instructions of January 5, 1804, were also drawn by Mr. 
Madison, in his capacity of Secretary of State, and contain the 
plan of a convention on the subject of seamen, with some other 
matters, giving the proposal and the ultimatum. The first arti- 
cle provides, that no person shall be demanded or taken at sea, 
out of a. ship of one nation, by the armed ships of the other, un- 
less he is liable to be so taken according to the laws of nations ; 
and not then, if he makes part of the crew. In the observations 
on the plan, Mr. Madison asserts, and reasons on, the I'ight of 
ilag, and the article is drawn with a view to our claim, and to pre- 



55 

vent search and seizure at sea. The eighth article provide&j 
that no refuge shall be given to persons deserting from a vessel, 
making part of the crew of such vessel: and the eleventh article 
provides, that " each party will prohibit its citizens or subjects 
from clandestinely carrying away, from the territories or do- 
minions of the other, any seamen or soldiers belonging to such 
other party." These articles embrace every part of the con- 
vention which relate to seamen. In them therefore are to be 
found, if any where, the arrangement said to have been repeat- 
edly proposed to the British government. I shall not examine 
how far such an arrangement Avas desirable to this country; but 
did it secure to England the control of its own people, the re- 
covery of its own subjects? 

In this plan we find no provision against the employment of 
British seamen, even deserters. Those already in the country 
might plainly go into our service, and those who might subse- 
quently reach our shores, Avere safe when our flag should be 
vaving over their heads. Deserters, it is true, were to be 
i^iven up ; but how could this be done, when they were on the 
high seas, or had embarked in foreign voyages ? The convention, 
as proposed, will be found, Avhen examined, not to secure toGieat- 
Britian the service of her seiin)en,or the return of her subjects. 

Is it true that the British government would listen to no terms, 
that they have refused to negociate on this subject ? bir, it is 
not true. Lord Grenville, in his letter to Mr. King, of the 27th 
of March, 1797, which I have already mentioned, uses these ex- 
pressions — " If it were possible at once to fiiid an obvious and 
indisputable mode of ascertaining whether a seaman is really a 
subject of his majesty's dominions, or a citizen of the United 
States, certainly the King's government would not hesitute to 
accede to any regulations for applying that rule, in the easiest, 
most expeditious, and most cfTcctual manner." After staling his 
objections to our act for llie relief and protection of American 
seamen, he goes on to say, " for the reasons which I have here 
stated, the force of which I am confident no candid mind can dis- 
pute, I am under the necessity of declining, on the part of his 
majesty's government, to accede to the propositions contained in 
your letter. If any other proposals can be made, less liable to 
objection, they will be considered with candour and liberality. 
It is 7iOt expected^ that on so difficult and delicate a business^ ar- 
rangements can at once be brought forward, nvholhj free from 
all objections, or such as to supersede the necessity of frequent 
revisal, improvement, and addition, in ordei' to meet the differ- 
ent means of evasion that may be resorted to ; but it is certainly 
not too much to ask, that the rules adopted in the first instance, 
shall at least afford some security against the most extensive 
and the most dangerous consequences to the maritime power 
and safety of Great-Britain." 

Sir, I cannot but admire the force and dignity of the letter of 
which I have read part. The importance of the subject to both 
nations is fairlv admitted, ond a solicitude is evinced for the 



36 

adoplion of some regulation which would afford security to 
each. A distmct avowal is made, that the British government 
do not want our seamen, if they can be left in possession of their 
own. And a suggestion is added, that a perfect arrangement 
is not to be expected on the first attempt. Difficulties will 
arise in practice in any settlement of this business. All that 
is wanted is a point to start from, and a disposition in both gov- 
ernments to deal fairly and justly I am not afraid to assert, 
that if the arrangement of Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, in 1806, 
had been adopted with this spirit, we should now have thoughts 
of impressments merely as an evil which once existed. 

But, Mr. Chairman, to come nearer to the present times. In 
the letter from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney to Mr. Madison, 
of the 1 Ith of September, 1806, it is stated that the British com- 
missioners pressed nuitli much zeal " a provision, that the 
persons, composing the crews of such ships, should be furnish- 
ed with authentic documents of citizenship, the nature and 
form of which should be settled by treaty ; that these docu- 
ments, should completely protect those to whom they related ; 
but that, subject to such protections, the ships of war of Great- 
Britain should continue to visit and impress on the main ocean 
as heretofore," This provision was rejected by our ministers, 

1 will not syy that such a regulation ought to have been adopt- 
ed ; but 1 will say, that the proposition proves, that the English 
government was anxious to adjust this difference ; and it proves 
further, that the great object of the British was the recovery of 
their own citizens. 

The letter of the 1 1 th November, 1806, from Messrs. Monroe 
and Pinckney to Mr. Madison, gives the history of the negocia- 
tion which led to the ct;lebrated arrangement. Permit me to 
furnish you with one or two extracts from the letter, explana- 
tory of the views and feelings of the British government. " At 
our meeting the next day, the British commissioners stated ex» 
plicitly, but in a very conciliatory manner, that it was not in 
Iheir fionver to adofit an article in the opirit of our firoject ; that 
the board of admiralty had been consulted on the subject, as had 
also been the crown officers in Doctors' Commons, who united 
all, without exception, in the opinion, that the right of their 
government in the case in question was well founded, and ought 
not to be relinquished. They added, that, under such circumstan- 
ces, the reliyiqidshjncnt of it ivas a measure which the govern-' 
•ment could 7iot adofit, without taking ujion itself a resjionsibility 
which no ministry would be willing to meet, however pressing the 
emergency might be. They presented to us, at the same time, a 
counter project, which they intimated they did in obedience to 
the instructions from their government. The British commis-* 
sioncrs, after supporting with great force, but with candour, the 
claim of their government, assured us that it was willing to do 
any thing in its power, to satisfy the U7iited States on the ground 
of complaint, which might be done without a relinquishment of 
their claim," 



Che amount of this information is, that owing to the feelings, 
the views, and perhaps the prejudices, of the British people, no 
ministry dare formally to relinquish the right claimed in the 
abstract; but that everything short of this might be expected. 
We were not to look for a formal surrender of the right, but a 
regulation of the practice under it. Recollect, Sir, that this is a 
declaration of the Fox and Grenville ministry, always understood 
to have been most lair and most friendly to this country. Sir, I 
am satisfied, and so I am sure are a part at least of the adminis- 
tration, that if this subject is ever settled, it will be by arrange- 
ments to prevent injuries to the two countries, in the employ- 
ment and impressing of seamen, leaving the rights claimed on 
both sides untouched. Any attempt at negociation with Great- 
Britain, on the ground of an abandonment of her claim, is to my 
■mind perfectly hopeless : arkd as long as I find the administra- 
tion insisting on this as indispensable, so long I rrvust believe, 
that it is " vrithin the scope of their policy" to continue the war, 
and to make it interminable. 

Our ministers, in their letter of the 11 th of November, go on to 
slate, that at their request the British commissioners communi- 
cated to them a note, which was to accompany and fo give cha- 
racter to the arrangement. The note declares, that the British 
government " had not felt itself prepared to disclaim or derogate 
from a right which has ever been uniformly and generally main- 
tained, and in the exercise of which the security of the British 
navy may be essentially involved ; more especially, in a conjunc- 
ture when they were engaged in war, which enforces the neces- 
sity of the most vigilant attention to the preservation and sup- 
ply of the naval force of the kingdom ;" but, " that hh majes- 
cy's govcnnent.^ actuated by an earnest desire to remove every 
cause of dissatisfaction^ had directed his majesty* s commissioners 
io give to J\Jr. Monroe and Mr. Finckney, the most /lositive as- 
surances, that instructions have been given, and shall be refieat- 
ed,and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution in 
the impressing of British seamen ; and that th:- greatest care 
shall betaken to preserve the citizens of the United States from 
any molestation or injury ; and that immediate and prompt re- 
dress shall be afforded upon any representation of injury sus- 
tained by them." Sir, this note, and the offers made by the 
British commissioners, were satisfactory to our negociators, 
and an arrangement was accordingly agreed upon. The Ame- 
rican cabinet, however, refused to accept it ; it was sent back, 
and the affair of the Chesapeake soon alter closed the door on 
any further discussion. How unfair is it then to say, or to in- 
sinuate, that the British goveniment have refused to treat on 
this subject, or to listen to terms which would secure to it the 
service of its own seamen '. 

The opinions of Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, respecting 
the merits and the effect of the arrangement, might be collect- 
ed fr6m the circumstance of their agreement to it, but it is not 
>ft to inference. In our public papers, they will be found to 



38 

have expressed themselves with great clearness and decision. 
In the letter of November, they say, " When we take hito view 
all that has passed on the subject, we are far from considering 
the note of the British commissioners as a mere circumstance 
of foj-m. We persuade ourselves, that by accepting the invita- 
tion which it gives, and pl'oceeding in the negociation, we nhall 
place the business almost^ if not altogetJieVy on as good a footing 
hs we should have done by treaty., had the project which we of 
fered them been accejited, — it merits attention, that every thing 
is expressed in it that could be desired, except the rclinr/uish- 
ment of the principle ; that, in speaking of impressments, the 
exercise of that act on the high seas is not mentioned, an 
omission which we know to have been intentional." 

And in their letter to Mr. Madison, of the third of January, 
1807, transmitting the treaty, the same gentlemen refer to the 
letter of November, as containing their opinion, that although 
the British government did not feel itself at liberty to relin- 
quish formally by treaty its claim to search our merchant ves- 
sels for British seamen, its practice would nevertheless be es' 
senlially, if not completely, abandoned. They go on to remark, 
*' that opinion has been since confirmed, by frequent conferen- 
ces on the subject with the British commissioners, who have 
repeatedly assured us, that in their judgment, we were made 
as secure against the ejrercise of their pretension, by the poli- 
cy which their government harl adopted, in regard to that very 
delicate and important question, as we could have been made 
by treaty. It is proper however to observe, that the good effect 
of this disposition, and its continuance, may depend in a great 
measure on the means which may be taken by the congress 
hereafter, to check desertion from the British service." 

You will scarcely think it possible, Sir, that evidence can be 
furnished, which will more strongly negative the assertion, that 
the communications to the British government, on the subject 
of impressment, passed without effect ; and yet such evidence 
<loes exist. I will now call your attention to the letter from 
Mr. Monroe to Mr. Madison, of the 28th February, 1808, dated 
at Richmond. In this letter, Mr. Monroe says, " the idea en- 
tertained by the public is, that the rights of the United States 
were abandoned by the American commissioners, in the late 
negociation, and that their seamen were left, by tacit acquies- 
cence, if not by formal renunciation, to depend for their safety 
on the mercy of the British cruizcrs. I have, on the contrary, 
always believed, and still do believe, that the ground on which 
that interest was placed, by the paper of the British commis' 
sioners of November 8th, 1806, and the explanations which ac- 
companied it, was both honourable and advantageous to the 
U7iited States ; and that it contained a concession in their fa- 
vour, on the part of Great-Britain, on the great principle in 
;©ntestation, never before made, by a formal and obligatory act 
jf the government, which was highly favourable to their interest.'' 

Tn u subsequent part of the same letter, Mr. Monroe, speak- 



59 

ing of the note, and the omission in it of the terms " high 
seas," remarks, " it is impossible that those terms could have 
been omitted intentionally with our knowledge, lor any purpose 
other than to admit a construction, that it was intended that im- 
pressments should be confined to the land. I do not mean to 
imply that it was understood, between the British commission- 
ers and us, that Great-Britain should abandon the practice of 
impressment on the high seas altogether. I mean, however, dis^ 
tinctly CO slate, that it was understood, that the practice hereto- 
fore pursued by her should be aba7!doncdy and that no im/iressmenc 
should be made on the /ngh seas, under the obligation of that pa- 
per, except in cases of an extraordinary nature, to which no gene- 
ral prohibition against it could be construed fairly to extend." 

Again, and it is the last reference I shall make to these do- 
cuments, not because much and material matter does not re- 
mahi, but because I am really tired of the subject. Mr. Mon- 
roe, in his Richmond letter, declares, " We were, therefore, de- 
cidedly of opinion, that the paper of the British commissioners 
placed the interest of impressment on ground which it was both 
aafc aiid/ionourable for the United States to admit ; that, in short, 
h gave their government the command of the subject for every 
necessary and useful /lur/iose. Attached to the treaty, it was the 
basis or condition on which the treaty rested. Strong in its char- 
acter in their favour on the great question of right, and admit- 
ting a favourable construction on others, it placed them on more 
elevated ground^ in those respects, than they had held before." 

The statements thus made by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney, 
establish a few facts of gieat importance, which cannot be too 
generally known or too frequently repeated. Kept constantly in 
recollection, and applied as touchstones to olfcrs which have 
been, or may be made, to the British government, they will 
show the sincerity of the administration, or their insincerity. 
They prove that the British will negociate on the subject of 
seamen, inasmuch as they have done it. They prove that the 
British will come to an arrangement with us : for this they have 
ofiered. And they prove that the British will accede to proposi- 
tions relating to impressments, which arc safe and honourable, 
and therefore satisfactory to this country ; for this we are told 
they did. But they prove also, that no ministry in England dare 
r>pcnly and avowedly relinquish the right of search, or recog- 
nise, to the extent demanded by us, the right of flag. The 
practice may be so Fegulated, and was offered to be so regulat- 
ed, as to bring the claim into disuse. And what to us is a 
right claimed but not enforced ? When I find the administra- 
tion dealing less in abstract propositions about seanien's rights 
and national honour, and attending to what is really to be desir- 
ed and is known to be attainable, 1 shall believe in their pacific 
dispositions, and not till then. 

From the time I first saw the arrangement made by Messrs. 
Monroe and Pinckney, with their account of the negociation, 
-.nd the explanatory statement of Mr. Monroe, I have believed. 



40 

that the subject of seamen was placed by Uiem on a safe and 
proper footing. And it has always been with me, feeling as I 
do for seamen and their rights, a matter of great regret, that 
the arrangement was not agreed to here. A short experience 
would have satisfied us as to its practical operation. If by it 
our sailors were protected, a great good would have been gain- 
ed. If otherwise, our claim lor other terms could not have 
been resisted. The gentlemen, however, who negociated the 
arrangement, have changed characters, and with it, it would 
seem, their views. They now make a part of the administra- 
tion, and as such, feel themselves authorized to say, that the 
British Government have refused to settle the difference on 
suitable terms. They advised war, and require its continuance 
on this account. I am not to doubt, that some new light has led to 
t-his course ; and it is possible, that with means of information.. 
I may be induced to give up my opinion also. As yet, however, I 
have seen nothing which destroys the force of their reasoning. 

I have now, Sir, finished the remarks which 1 intended to 
make on the British claim and practice of impressment. Wc 
have for years past had so much idle declamation on the sub- 
ject, that a dispassionate investigation of it appeared to me 
to be called for. In the course of these remarks, I have at- 
tempted to show that the claim was neither novel nor peculiar, 
and that it is not wholly unsupported by reason ; that our true 
interest calls more for a fair regulation of the practice than an 
abandonment of the rights, and that the conduct of the British 
of late, has been such as to warrant an opinion, that an arrange- 
ment may be made, having ior its object a proper regulation of 
the practice, leaving the rights of both nations, whatever they 
iTiay be, untouched. Sir, with this view of the subject, it is 
not possible for me to consent to the adoption of measures, 
having for their object the further prosecution of the war offen- 
sively on our part ; a id I cannot therefore vote for the bill on 
your table. The war has not yet assumed a character. We 
have indeed added much, and are about to add more, to the pub- 
lic debt. Already a portion of our citizens are burdened with 
oppressive exactions in the form of duties, and heavy taxes are 
staring all in the face. But yet our homes and altars remain 
safe and unpolluted. Let us seize this moment to give the na- 
tion peace, and the people happiness. T.'us is the appointed time, 
and if we do not improve it, I fear my country is to suffer in its 
prosperity and its institutions. For heaven's sake let us pause. 

Mr. Chairman, I intended, when I first rose, to have made 
some observations on the effects and consequences of this war ; 
and to have examined what the administration is pleased to term 
its pacific advances ; but I am really so exhausted that I have 
Bot the ability to go on, if the committee had patience to at- 
tend to me. With respect to the advances, I will make but a 
single remark, and that is, that from the circumstances undei 
which they were made, they were exactly calculated, if not intend- 
ed, to produce the result we have witaes^ed. Sir, I have doni.- 



39 y 













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